The authors empirically tested the similarity metrics underlying 2 predictive-learning theories: J. K. Kruschke's (1992) attention learning covering map and J. M. Pearce's (1987 Pearce's ( , 1994 configural models. In Experiment 1, participants concurrently learned 3 types of discriminations: simple (AϪ vs. Bϩ), common cue (XCϪ vs. XDϩ), and compound (YEϪ vs. ZFϩ). Accuracy was ordered: simple Ͼ compound Ͼ common cue. Neither model anticipated this ordering. In Experiment 2, cue order in 2-element configurations was either inconsistent (e.g., YE and EY) as in Experiment 1 or consistent (e.g., EY throughout). Although accuracy differences were smaller under consistent ordering, the relative difficulty of the tasks was the same as in Experiment 1. In Experiment 3, common cue and compound discriminations were tested in different participants to determine whether the ordering of difficulty in Experiments 1 and 2 was caused by differential generalization mediated by the number of elements; the ordering was the same as in Experiments 1 and 2. These results suggest the need for differential attention to event presence and absence and to mechanisms that incorporate limited attentional capacity.
In the process of everyday living, one is bombarded by a never-ending stream of events, each consisting of myriad features. Out of this chaos, one comes to attend to some events, to ignore others, and to learn the relationships of one event to another, thus allowing one to judge the probability of future events. We refer to the process by which people learn these relationships as predictive learning. Research on causal learning (a cross section can be found in Shanks, Holyoak, & Medin, 1996) , covariation detection (e.g., Alloy & Tabachnik, 1984; Cheng & Novick, 1992; Hutchinson & Alba, 1997; Lewicki, 1986) , multiple-cue probability learning (e.g., Edgell, 1978; Edgell, Castellan, Roe, & Barnes, 1996; Edgell & Roe, 1995; Kruschke & Johansen, 1999) , and function learning (e.g., DeLosh, Busemeyer, & McDaniel, 1997; Koh, 1993; Koh & Meyer, 1991) collectively serve to enlighten the cognitive processes that subserve one's ability to engage in predictive learning and thus to judge event relationships for the purposes of decision making.
To predict a future event, learners must attend to a number of alternative predictors. The situation is analogous to that faced in a multiple regression analysis. There are multiple predictors, each having differential predictive efficacy and some with no significant efficacy; the analysis must determine the relative weights of the various predictors, with some potentially having no predictive power whatsoever (i.e., they have regression weights that do not differ significantly from zero). Early models of the learning process (e.g., treated each predictor as statistically independent; therefore, these models could consider only the equivalent of main effects. This shortcoming was soon corrected to include interactions by allowing configurations of predictors to have independent predictive power . Configural representations encode a predictor within a particular context. The power of this contextual encoding is the basis of modern models of predictive learning.
Models that emphasize configural representations (e.g., Kruschke, 1992; Kruschke & Johansen, 1999; Pearce, 1987 Pearce, , 1994 have had good success as models of predictive learning (DeLosh et al., 1997; Kruschke, 2001; Shanks, Charles, Darby, & Azmi, 1998; Young, Wasserman, Johnson, & Jones, 2000) . In studies of causal learning, Kruschke's (1992) attention learning covering map (ALCOVE) and Pearce's (1987 Pearce's ( , 1994 configural cue model (CCM) have been particularly popular. These models, nevertheless, differ in many ways. Our intent was to begin a systematic investigation of one specific difference that produces significant divergence in each model's behavior.
In this article, we compare the similarity metrics of ALCOVE and CCM and evaluate them as models of a specific causal learning task. The results have implications for a broad class of geometric models of similarity and for Tversky's (1977) feature contrast model. is judged from the degree of overlap between each set of features (both models assume that a stimulus is readily divided into a set of features; for a discussion of this assumption, see Schyns, Goldstone, & Thilbaut, 1998; Schyns & Murphy, 1994) . For example, both models predict that when faced with the AB configuration, decision makers respond on the basis of responses previously associated with similar cues (e.g., A, B, ABC) rather than on the basis of responses previously associated with dissimilar cues (e.g., C, DEF). The two models differ, however, in how they determine the similarity of cue configurations.
In Kruschke's (1992) ALCOVE, configural similarity is a function of the number of features that two configurations do not share. In Pearce's (1994) CCM, configural similarity is a function of the proportion of features that two configurations do share. Kruschke's (1992 
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ALCOVE's similarity function is the same as that in Nosofsky's (1986) generalized context model, which in turn was adapted from Shepard's (1987) theory of similarity and generalization. These similarity metrics are from a broader class of geometric models that represent configurations as points in a multidimensional space; the dissimilarity between configurations is represented by the distance between their corresponding points in this space (Carroll & Arabie, 1998) .
In ALCOVE, the similarity between a stimulus configuration (defined by a vector of i features, a, representing the activation vector) and the internal representation of a configuration (another vector of i features, h, representing the hidden unit vector) is a function of d, the distance between the vectors. This distance is defined by the Minkowski metric:
where r and q are free parameters that determine the shape of the generalization function. Kruschke (1992) , following Shepard's (1987) study, usually adopted a city-block metric (r ϭ 1) with an exponential similarity gradient (q ϭ 1), because his categorization tasks involved separable dimensions (Shepard, 1991) . So, Equation 1 reduced to
For the types of tasks in our predictive-learning experiments (all of which use separable dimensions), the distance between a stimulus and an internal representation of a stimulus would be the sum of the feature differences of the stimulus vectors-a measure of city-block distance. For example, the distance between Stimulus AB and Representation A would be 1.0 (they match on all features except the presence-absence of Feature B), and the distance between AB and DEF would be 5.0 (they differ in five features, the presence-absence of A, B, D, E, and F) when it is assumed that the presence of a feature is designated by a value of 1.0 and its absence as a value of 0.0.
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Because the distance measure, d, is 0.0 when two configurations are identical, this measure is transformed into a similarity measure, s, which has a maximal value of 1.0 when two configurations are identical and tapers off toward 0.0 as the number of differences between the configurations increases. It is
where c is a positive constant that defines the degree of generalization. As c approaches 0.0, observed differences are increasingly ignored, thus generating an s near 1.0; as c increases, observed differences loom larger, thus generating progressively smaller s values. The constant c provides a free parameter, the value of which is expected to differ across learning situations. Note that any two configurations potentially differ in an infinite number of ways. Therefore, the application of Equations 1-3 assumes that the vector is limited to potentially relevant features; other features (e.g., font, room color, ambient noise level) receive little attention and thus have minimal impact on judged similarity. Indeed, ALCOVE assumes that each feature, i, has an attentional weight, ␣ i , that modifies computation of d (each feature difference in Equation 1 is multiplied by its corresponding ␣ i ). The ␣ i for an irrelevant feature is assumed to be zero; it thus has no impact on judgments of similarity.
To summarize, ALCOVE and other models that rely on the Minkowski metric (e.g., RASHNL; Kruschke & Johansen, 1999; and GCM; Nosofsky, 1986) compute similarity as a function of the number of features that two configurations do not share (cf. the distinctive features model originally introduced by Restle, 1961) . Pearce's (1987 Pearce's ( , 1994 Configural Cue Model Pearce's (1994) similarity function was an adaptation of the similarity function used in his earlier model (Pearce, 1987) , which was derived from Atkinson and Estes's (1963) study. In Pearce's (1987) study, the similarity between the vectors a and h is given by the expression
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where n c is the number of shared features, n a is the number of features in configuration a, and n h is the number of features in configuration h; only present features are considered in Equation 4. For example, the similarity between Stimulus AB and Representation A would be 1 2 /(2 ϫ 1) ϭ 0.5, and the similarity between AB and DEF would be 0 2 /(2 ϫ 3) ϭ 0.0. Pearce (1994) offered a slightly different formulation; the similarity between the configurations, a and h, was determined by the squared normalized dot product of the two vectors:
1 Despite recent applications of ALCOVE to causal learning, ALCOVE was originally designed to model categorization involving continuous dimensions and not to model situations in which a feature or event is present or absent (J. Kruschke, personal communication, November 18, 2000) .
where each configuration's feature is either absent (a i or h i ϭ 0.0) or present with a positive activation value (Յ 1.0), the magnitude of which depends on the event's salience.
When the configurations are limited to specifying the presence or absence of each feature (a vector of zeros and ones), as is the case in experiments involving causal learning, Equations 4 and 5 reduce to identical formulations. Under these conditions, the Pearce (1987) specification of similarity (Equation 4) divulges the importance of common features in CCM: Similarity is a direct function of the number of features that two configurations share (n c ; for a discussion of common features model in general, see Sattath & Tversky, 1987) .
Just as any two configurations potentially differ in an infinite number of ways, they are also potentially identical in an infinite number of ways (the context alone contains innumerable features). So, just as is true in Kruschke's (1992) ALCOVE, the application of Equation 4 or 5 assumes that the vector is limited to potentially relevant features; other features are assumed to receive little attention and thus to have minimal impact on judged similarity. Pearce (1987) , like Kruschke (1992) , also included an attentional parameter, ␣ i , for each feature of the stimulus vector; these parameters would likewise be zero for the panoply of features that are known (from preexperimental experience) to be irrelevant to the task.
A Direct Comparison
The two models thus compute similarity in two fundamentally different ways; this difference has profound effects on their respective predictions. ALCOVE and other models using the Minkowski metric compute similarity as a function of the number of differences between configurations, whereas CCM computes similarity as a function of the proportion of elements that two configurations share. The following examples will clarify the consequences of this difference.
Consider discriminating a single cue, A, from another single cue, B. These two configurations differ in two features: the presence-absence of A and the presence-absence of B. The configurations also share no features (in Pearce's 1987 Pearce's , 1994 , formulation, the absent features that are shared are coded with an activation of 0.0; therefore, adding more zeros to the numerator or denominator of Equation 5 does not increase similarity). Both models would judge the two configurations to be quite different. For ALCOVE, s is e Ϫ2c , and for CCM, s is 0.0 (the squared normalized dot product of two orthogonal vectors). Now, consider discriminating a two-element configuration, XA, from another two-element configuration, XB. These two configurations differ in two features: the presence-absence of A and the presence-absence of B. The configurations also share a single feature, X. So, for ALCOVE, s is again e Ϫ2c , but for CCM, s is now 1 2 /(2 ϫ 2) ϭ 0.25. Therefore, ALCOVE predicts that adding a common feature, X, to the A versus B discrimination will have no effect (similarity is e Ϫ2c for both discriminations), but CCM predicts that doing so will make the discrimination more difficult because the two configurations are more similar (s ϭ 0.25) than they were in the original A versus B discrimination (s ϭ 0.0).
Lastly, consider discriminating a two-element configuration, AC, from another two-element configuration, BD. These two configurations differ in four features: the presence or absence of A, B, C, and D. The configurations also share no features. For ALCOVE, s is now e Ϫ4c (i.e., a smaller number than before, because of the greater number of differences; 4 vs. 2), but for CCM, s is 0.0, the same as it was in the original A versus B discrimination. So, ALCOVE predicts that adding a second distinctive feature, C/D, to the A versus B discrimination will make the discrimination easier, because the similarity between the configurations is decreased; but, CCM predicts that this manipulation will have no effect on the discrimination, because the two configurations still share no features (s ϭ 0.0).
To assess the accuracy of these predictions, we designed Experiments 1 and 2 so that participants concurrently learned three types of discriminations: simple (AϪ vs. Bϩ), common cue (XCϪ vs. XDϩ), and compound (YEϪ vs. ZFϩ), corresponding to the three situations described above. The similarity metric of ALCOVE predicts that accuracy should be ordered compound Ͼ simple ϭ common cue, whereas the similarity metric of CCM predicts that accuracy should be ordered simple ϭ compound Ͼ common cue (see Table 1 ).
Other Differences
It is thus readily apparent that these two seemingly similar metrics can generate very different predictions. Our intention was to directly evaluate these two metrics. It is possible, however, that other differences in the encompassing models might mitigate or accentuate the difference in similarity functions. For example, (a) ALCOVE uses trainable attention weights, whereas CCM allows only static, predetermined attention weights; (b) ALCOVE allows the association between each hidden unit configuration with the outcome to change on every trial (leaky learning), whereas CCM allows only the most active hidden unit configuration to change its association on any given trial (winner take all); (c) ALCOVE assumes that each outcome is equally salient, whereas CCM allows differential weighting of the presence and absence of an outcome (the occurrence of an outcome is generally assumed to be more salient than is its nonoccurrence); and (d) ALCOVE maps output activations to response probabilities by means of a choice rule (cf. Luce, 1963; Shepard, 1987) , whereas CCM does not.
Unpublished simulations revealed that changing the attentional learning algorithm (no learning vs. learning), the associative learning algorithm (leaky learning vs. winner take all), the differential weighting of outcome presence or absence, or the use of a choice rule all failed to change the ordinal predictions of either model for the tasks used here (Young et al., 2000, however, showed that the Kruschke, 1992 , showed that including dynamic attentional learning can also alter ordinal predictions in some category-learning tasks). Therefore, we predicted that our three discrimination tasks should allow us to determine which model's similarity metric better accounts for participants' behavior in our predictive-learning task.
Related Findings
The effect of adding a common feature. Several studies involving both humans (e.g., Castellan, 1973; Gati & Tversky, 1984; Ritov, Gati, & Tversky, 1990 ) and nonhuman animals (e.g., Pearce, George, & Redhead, 1998; Pearce & Redhead, 1993) suggest that the presence of the irrelevant X in the common cue discrimination will slow learning. According to standard accounts of this phenomenon, the addition of irrelevant common features increases the similarity of the stimuli being compared (Pearce & Redhead, 1993; Ritov et al., 1990) . This increase in similarity retards discriminative learning, but this result depends on the salience and the number of common features (there is a clear point of diminishing returns; Gati & Tversky, 1984) .
If this result is so well established, then why does the Minkowski metric, which predicts that adding common features will not affect discrimination, persist as a viable measure of similarity? The answer is to be found in the nature of the stimuli for which these models were proposed and tested. In most studies of categorization, dimensions of discriminability are omnipresent. Color, size, orientation, and location are always present but take on different values for different stimuli. If two stimuli have a common color, then they match on the color dimension; if they do not have a common color, then they differ on the color dimension. Therefore, a greater observed difficulty in discriminating between a blue square and a blue circle than between a blue square and a red circle could be due to the addition of a common feature impairing learning in the first case (both blue) or to the addition of a distinguishing feature facilitating learning in the second case (one blue, one red).
In other categorization studies, this tradeoff does not occur, because features may be present or absent. For example, Ritov et al. (1990) used pictures in which clouds, a fence, or a farm crop were present or absent. These types of experiments provide a purer test of the effect of adding a common feature while not simultaneously removing a distinguishing feature. Models that rely on the Minkowski metric do not make the correct prediction under these circumstances (Ritov et al., 1990 ). Given that our task involved the presence or absence of features, we expected that ALCOVE's prediction of equally learnable simple and compound discrimination would not hold.
The effect of adding a distinctive feature. Several studies involving both humans (e.g., Biederman & Checkosky, 1970; Bourne & Haygood, 1961; Egeth, 1966; Restle, 1959; Ritov et al., 1990) and nonhuman animals (e.g., Kamin, 1969; Sutherland & Holgate, 1966; Warren, 1953) have revealed that the presence of a redundant feature (as occurred in our compound discrimination) improves task performance over that observed when the feature is absent (as occurs in our simple discrimination) or is irrelevant. Simply put, the addition of relevant, redundant features provides additional ways to distinguish between stimuli.
For example, Restle (1959) examined the learning of three types of problems, one in which A was relevant and B was not, one in which B was relevant and A was not, and one in which both were relevant and redundant. He found faster learning in the compound problem (both cues relevant) than in the simple problems (only one cue relevant), consistent with the Minkowski metric of similarity but not with that of the CCM. Both cues were present in all three problems-only their relevance changed. Thus, a present but irrelevant cue would be expected to distract attention and require the subject to learn to ignore (or neutralize, per Restle, 1959 ) the cue (see also Bourne & Haygood, 1961) . Restle (1959) offered his own theoretical model of the learning process; it, like ALCOVE, correctly predicted that adding relevant, redundant cues to each stimulus will decrease the judged similarity. But, unlike our predictive-learning task, these earlier studies regularly involved omnipresent features.
In contrast, Ritov et al. (1990) required participants to judge the relative similarity of pairs of stimuli, each involving the presence of one or two features ( p, q, x, and y, each corresponding to a variety of features across their experiments; e.g., the presence of clouds or a fence). In Experiment 1 of that study, participants judged the p and py stimuli to be more similar than the px and py stimuli; this result is consistent with CCM's measure of similarity (for p vs. py, s ϭ .50; for px vs. py, s ϭ .25; see Equation 4). Later experiments of that study, however, provided a stronger test of common feature models like the CCM; participants judged the relative similarity of p and q versus px and q (both of which produce an s of 0.0 in CCM). There, participants judged the former pair of stimuli to be more similar than the latter pair, as predicted by models like ALCOVE.
A dilemma? In our search for a model of predictive learning in which features or events are present or absent, we were left in a theoretical quandary. CCM, but not ALCOVE, appears to correctly predict that adding a common feature to two objects will increase their judged similarity, but ALCOVE, and not CCM, appears to correctly predict that adding redundant, distinctive features will decrease judged similarity. However, differences in our stimuli and task and the stimuli and tasks used by others may be consequential.
For example, Ritov et al. (1990) found that the impact of redundant, relevant features on similarity judgment was reduced when the features of a stimulus were less integrated. In Experiment 3 of that study, the stimuli involved a collection of common living-room objects that were arranged in a natural or an unnatural configuration. When the arrangement was unnatural, adding a distinctive component to each stimulus (e.g., adding a rug to one and a plant to the other) had no impact on the judged similarity of the stimuli; but, when the arrangement was natural, adding a distinctive component decreased judged similarity.
We entertained the possibility that attentional limitations mediate the perceived similarity of stimuli. When multiple features are present, spatially separated, and in unpredictable locations (i.e., not placed in a natural setting), the human visual system may, in fact, find it difficult to ascertain all of the information that is present. More concretely, adding distinctive, spatially separate features to stimuli may require more scanning of the stimuli to identify their features, which may partially offset or eclipse the benefit of these added features. Research has revealed that attending to multiple features of a single object is easier than attending to single features of multiple objects (e.g., Duncan, 1984 Duncan, , 1993 Vecera & Farah, 1994) .
Thus, the results of traditional categorization studies in which each stimulus involves multiple features of a single object may differ from the results of studies in which each stimulus involves a collection of objects or events. Although some studies have examined judged similarity with collections of objects (Gati & Tversky, 1984; Ritov et al., 1990) , the participants had an unlimited time in which to make their judgments; therefore, attentional limitations should have had little, if any, impact. The same may not be true for our predictive-learning task.
Experiment 1
Method
Participants. Sixty students enrolled in an introductory psychology course at the University of Iowa served as voluntary participants. They received course credit for their participation.
Materials. The experiment was programmed using PsyScope (Version 1.0.2; Cohen, MacWhinney, Flatt, & Provost, 1993) on four Power Macintosh 7100/80 computers.
Nine different fictional chemicals-Adelpine, Bucagon, Dayceril, Furval, Glexus, Morphid, Quillium, Rezitak, and Sopatonin-were used as cues to aid the participants in their prediction of positive and negative outcomes. The cues were presented in 18-point, bold, black New York font in the center of the screen. Outcomes (REACTION or no reaction) were presented directly below the cues in 18-point, bold, red New York font. The reaction outcomes were emphasized through capitalization to approximate the conditions present in a conditioning experiment in which outcome occurrence is more salient than outcome nonoccurrence (e.g., food vs. no food or shock vs. no shock). This asymmetry is important in distinguishing causal learning from categorization (Gilovich, 1991; Nisbett & Ross, 1980) . Procedure. Between 1 and 4 participants were studied concurrently on four identically configured computer workstations. Each participant sat in front of a workstation and listened to the experimenter's recitation of a series of general instructions. Participants then read their instructions on the computer monitor (see the Appendix).
The participants pressed the 2 key to confirm their understanding of the instructions and to begin the experiment. The chemicals were presented in the center of the screen; when there were two chemicals programmed to appear together, one was presented directly above the other. Half of the trials involving each two-element configuration (e.g., AB) were presented with A above B and the other half with B above A (chemical order was counterbalanced within each block of trials). Only those chemicals that were present on the trial were displayed. The chemicals were programmed to appear on the screen for at least 1,000 ms. After 1,000 ms, the word RESPOND was displayed ( just below the middle of the screen) to prompt the participant to make a prediction. The chemical names remained on the screen until a response was made. The program did not register any responses that were made before presentation of the prompt.
Participants pressed the 1 key on the numeric keypad to signify their expectation of a chemical reaction and the 3 key to signify their expectation of no chemical reaction. Immediately following the keypress, the actual outcome was presented directly below the cue, and a correct response was followed by a pleasant tone (Correct Beep in PsyScope), whereas an incorrect response was followed by a harsh tone (Incorrect Beep in PsyScope). A reminder to press the 2 key to begin the next trial was also displayed. Following the 2 response, the percentage correct score was updated and the chemical or chemicals for the next trial were displayed.
During training, participants experienced six trial types, AϪ, Bϩ, XCϪ, XDϩ, YEϪ, and ZFϩ, where ϩ designated a trial on which a chemical reaction would occur and Ϫ designated a trial on which a chemical reaction would not occur. These trials fall into three conceptual learning categories for the purposes of our investigation: simple (AϪ vs. Bϩ), common cue (XCϪ vs. XDϩ), and compound (YEϪ vs. ZFϩ). The simple category involves discriminating two single cues that share no features (other than those of the general context and the number of cues [1] ). The common cue category involves discriminating two configurations that share one feature (X) and that differ in a second feature. The compound category involves discriminating two configurations that differ in two features and that have none in common. Although the trials fall into these three conceptual categories, they were randomly interspersed with no explicit demarcations during the training phase. Training consisted of six randomized blocks each comprising 24 trials for a total of 144 trials. Each block included 4 trials of each of the 6 trial types.
Assignment of cue identity to cue type was done through a partial 9 ϫ 9 Latin square: nine cues (Adelpine, Bucagon, Dayceril, Furval, Glexus, Morphid, Quillium, Rezitak, and Sopatonin) ϫ nine roles (A, B, C, D, E, F, X, Y, and Z). Each of the four workstations used a consistent assignment of cue to role.
Results and Discussion
Accuracy data. Figure 1 shows the accuracy of the simple (AϪ vs. Bϩ), common cue (XCϪ vs. XDϩ), and compound (YEϪ vs. ZFϩ) tasks averaged across the two trial types in each discrimination. Participants clearly found the simple discrimination to be easiest, the compound discrimination to be second easiest, and the common cue discrimination to be most difficult.
To confirm the statistical reliability of these differences, we subjected correct responses to a repeated measures analysis of variance (ANOVA) of discrimination (simple, common cue, or compound). The effect of discrimination was statistically significant, F(2, 118) ϭ 86.74, p Ͻ .01, MSE ϭ 0.203. Post hoc tests (Newman-Keuls; ␣ ϭ .05) revealed that all of the pairwise comparisons between the accuracies of the three discriminations were significant.
Reaction time (RT) data. To further confirm the relative difficulty of the three discriminations, and to ensure the absence of a speed-accuracy tradeoff, we examined the RTs indexed against the onset of the RESPONSE prompt. (Because the RTs were heavily skewed, all RTs were subjected to a logarithmic transformation before computing any statistics; the results were transformed back to the original units for presentation to increase clarity.) We again found that participants found the simple discrimination to be easiest (M ϭ 401 ms), the compound discrimination to be second easiest (M ϭ 431 ms), and the common cue discrimination to be most difficult (M ϭ 448 ms).
To confirm the statistical reliability of these differences, we subjected log(RT) to a repeated measures ANOVA of discrimination (simple, common cue, or compound). The effect of discrimination was statistically significant, F(2, 118) ϭ 13.69, p Ͻ .0001, MSE ϭ 0.124. Post hoc tests (Newman-Keuls; ␣ ϭ .05) revealed that all of the pairwise comparisons between the RTs of the three discriminations were significant.
Summary. Both analyses converge on the conclusion that the simple discrimination was easiest (80% accuracy and 401-ms RT), the compound discrimination was second easiest (63% and 431-ms RT), and the common cue discrimination was most difficult (57% and 448-ms RT).
Recall that in Experiment 1, we were interested in determining whether Kruschke's (1992) ALCOVE or Pearce's (1987 Pearce's ( , 1994 CCM would better predict the outcome of an investigation involving simple (AϪ vs. Bϩ), common cue (XCϪ vs. XDϩ), and compound (YEϪ vs. ZFϩ) discriminations. Kruschke's (1992) model predicted that the order of discrimination would be compound Ͼ simple ϭ common cue, whereas Pearce's (1987 Pearce's ( , 1994 model predicted that the order of discrimination would be simple ϭ compound Ͼ common cue. However, we found the following order of discriminability: simple Ͼ compound Ͼ common cue. Therefore, without the presence of some additional theoretical mechanism, neither model anticipated our results.
Experiment 2
A potentially important factor in training two-element configurations is the programmed order of the stimuli. Researchers used either a consistent order of presentation (e.g., Chapman, 1991; Chapman & Robbins, 1990; Williams, 1995; Williams, Sagness, & McPhee, 1994) or a counterbalanced order (e.g., Arcediano, Matute, & Miller, 1997; Wasserman & Berglan, 1998; Young et al., 2000) , or they did not include sufficient detail to determine the method used. Although models of predictive learning have ignored the possible role of order, its effects may be important and measurable.
One rationale for using inconsistent (counterbalanced) ordering of features in a predictive-learning task is that doing so prevents the observer from focusing on a single feature location (e.g., the bottom feature). In the present experiments, such a strategy could turn the XC versus XD discrimination into a C versus D discrimination (with X being ignored) and the YE versus ZF discrimination into an E versus F (or Y vs. Z) discrimination, thereby making all three discriminations identical. Therefore, the counterbalancing of stimulus order may be necessary to observe differences among the three discriminations.
Another possible consequence of counterbalancing the order of stimulus presentation is that the apparent learning disadvantage for two-element configurations in Experiment 1 may be due to the fact that each configuration (e.g., XC) is presented in two different ways (XC and CX). Therefore, learning may be slower for twoelement configurations because each configuration consists of distinct stimuli (XC and CX) that share two features (in this case, X and C) but differ in the presented order of those features. The higher variability in two-element configurations could retard learning, whereas the lower variability in one-element trials could speed learning (e.g., Posner & Keele, 1968; Wasserman & Bhatt, 1992) .
We predicted that if the effects observed in Experiment 1 were entirely driven by the more variable presentation of two-element configurations, then using a consistent order throughout training should abolish those effects and the originally predicted ordering of one of the models might emerge. If instead the effects were driven (at least in part) by other factors, then the order of difficulty observed in Experiment 1 should be preserved.
Method
Participants. Sixty-four students enrolled in an introductory psychology course at the University of Iowa served as voluntary participants. They received course credit for their participation.
Procedure. We used two training conditions in Experiment 2, with half of the participants assigned to each condition. The "inconsistent" condition was identical to the training procedure used in Experiment 1, in which the order of the two chemicals presented on two-element configuration trials was counterbalanced (e.g., half with A above B and half with B above A). The "consistent" condition was identical to the "inconsistent" condition, except that the ordering of chemicals remained consistent (e.g., A above B) throughout a participant's training session; for those chemicals that appeared in more than one trial type (the X in XC and XD), the chemical was presented in the same spatial location on both trial types.
Results
Accuracy data. Figure 2 shows accuracy for the simple (AϪ vs. Bϩ), common cue (XCϪ vs. XDϩ), and compound (YEϪ vs. ZFϩ) trials averaged across the two trial types in each discrimination. The participants again found the simple discrimination to be easiest, the compound discrimination to be second easiest, and the common cue discrimination to be most difficult in both con- ditions; however, the magnitude of the effect was smaller when the configurations were presented in a consistent order than when they were presented in an inconsistent (counterbalanced) order.
To confirm the statistical reliability of the differences, we subjected correct responses to a repeated measures ANOVA of discrimination (simple, common cue, or compound) nested within condition ("consistent" or "inconsistent"). The main effect of discrimination was statistically significant, F(2, 124) ϭ 53.51, p Ͻ .0001, MSE ϭ 0.484, as was the Discrimination ϫ Condition interaction, F(2, 124) ϭ 7.26, p Ͻ .0001, MSE ϭ 0.484. The main effect of condition was not significant, F Ͻ 1. Post hoc tests (Newman-Keuls, ␣ ϭ .05) revealed that all of the pairwise comparisons among the accuracies of the three discriminations were significant under inconsistent presentation (replicating Experiment 1). Under consistent presentation, however, the pairwise comparisons of simple versus compound and simple versus common cue were significant, but the compound versus common cue comparison was not, p Ͻ .20.
RT data. To further confirm the relative difficulty of the three discriminations, we examined the RTs indexed against the onset of the RESPONSE prompt (again using logarithm transformed data). A repeated measures ANOVA of discrimination (simple, common cue, or compound) nested within condition ("consistent" or "inconsistent") revealed a statistically significant main effect of discrimination, F(2, 124) ϭ 7.96, p Ͻ .0001, MSE ϭ 0.109, with neither the main effect of condition nor the Discrimination ϫ Condition interaction reaching significance, Fs Ͻ 1. The simple discrimination was easiest (M ϭ 396 ms), the compound discrimination was second easiest (M ϭ 410 ms), and the common cue discrimination was most difficult (M ϭ 428 ms), with each of the pairwise comparisons proving to be significant (Newman-Keuls; ␣ ϭ .05). However, the RT differences among the discriminations were smaller in Experiment 2 (a spread in RTs of 32 ms) than in Experiment 1 (spread of 47 ms). Also, the RTs for the "inconsistent" condition of Experiment 2 (a replication of Experiment 1) had a spread of 43 ms, whereas that for the "consistent" condition had a spread of 19 ms; as noted by the absence of a significant interaction, this difference between conditions did not reach statistical significance ( p ϭ .40).
Discussion
The relative difficulty of the discrimination tasks that was observed in Experiment 1 was replicated in Experiment 2. The magnitude of the effect, however, was significantly reduced when using a consistent order of feature presentation. Additionally, the accuracy difference between the compound and common cue discriminations did not reach statistical significance when the cues were presented in a consistent order, but the RT difference was significant overall. Therefore, the observed order of difficulty in Experiment 1 and in the "inconsistent" condition of Experiment 2 was not due to the greater variability in two-element configurations.
The increased variability in two-element configurations under inconsistent (counterbalanced) presentation order did not have a uniform effect on all configuration trials. A strict variability account predicts that presenting a configuration in a consistent order should have aided learning of both the common cue and compound discriminations, but accuracy was improved for the common cue discrimination only. Changes in order variability should also have had no effect on the trials involving only a single cue, but the simple discrimination was easier under inconsistent presentation than under consistent presentation (perhaps due to shifts in attention away from difficult discriminations). The specific improvement in learning on the common cue trials could be due to the necessity of allocating attention away from the less predictive X cue and toward the more predictive C and D cues; this proper allocation of attention is not necessary for either the compound or simple discriminations.
Experiment 3
In our attempt to understand the failure of the similarity metrics of ALCOVE and CCM to account for our data, we considered yet another possible explanation. Given that both theories predicted that the common cue discrimination would be the most difficult, it is possible that the difficulty of this task generalized to the other two-element trials (i.e., the compound discrimination). This generalized deficit could explain why the compound discrimination was more difficult than predicted by both theories.
To address this issue, we conducted a third experiment in which participants observed only one of the two-element discriminations (compound or common cue) in conjunction with the one-element discrimination (simple). We used this experimental design rather than a complete between-subject design (in which each participant learned only one of the discriminations) to increase statistical power through the use of a within-subject manipulation of some of the variables and to ensure that the experimental task was sufficiently demanding (thus avoiding ceiling effects). To compare the relative difficulty of the three tasks in Experiment 3, the simple discrimination provides the benchmark against which the other two discriminations could be compared.
Method
Participants. Fifty-six students enrolled in an introductory psychology course at Southern Illinois University at Carbondale served as voluntary participants. They received course credit for their participation.
Procedure. The basic procedure was identical to that used in Experiments 1 and 2. We used a 2 (cue order) ϫ 2 (compound task) betweensubjects design. As a conceptual replication of Experiment 2, half of the participants received a consistent ordering of the cues that constituted a two-element configuration and half received an inconsistent (counterbalanced) ordering of those cues. To ensure that each participant would observe only one of the two-element configuration tasks (thus preventing generalization between the two-element configurations that are part of different tasks), half of the participants in each cue-order group received the simple and compound discriminations, whereas the other half received the simple and common cue discriminations.
Training consisted of six randomized blocks each comprising 16 trials for a total of 96 trials. Each block included 4 trials of each of the four trial types.
Results
Accuracy data. Because statistical analyses (see below) revealed that the effect of cue order consistency was not significant, we collapsed the results across this variable to simplify our graphical presentation. Figure 3 shows the accuracy of the simple (in both conditions), common cue, and compound discriminations in the two compound-task conditions (averaged across the two trial types that constituted each discrimination). The participants again found the simple discrimination to be easiest, the compound discrimination to be second easiest, and the common cue discrimination to be most difficult. Overall accuracy was higher in Experiment 3 than in Experiments 1 and 2 (most notably for the common cue discrimination), but this result is almost certainly due to the smaller number of configurations given to each participant in Experiment 3 (four rather than six), which should make mastering the tasks much easier.
To confirm the statistical reliability of the differences, we subjected correct responses to a repeated measures ANOVA of discrimination (simple, common cue, or compound) nested within compound task (Simple-Common Cue vs. Simple-Compound) and consistency ("consistent" vs. "inconsistent"). The main effect of discrimination was statistically significant, F(2, 52) ϭ 18.87, p Ͻ .0001, MSE ϭ 0.344; no other effects were statistically significant. Post hoc tests (Newman-Keuls; ␣ ϭ .05) revealed that all of the pairwise comparisons among the accuracies of the three discriminations were significant (replicating Experiments 1 and 2).
RT data. To further confirm the relative difficulty of the three discriminations, we examined the RTs indexed against the onset of the RESPONSE prompt (again using logarithm transformed data). A repeated measures ANOVA of discrimination (simple, common cue, or compound) nested within compound task (simple-common cue vs. simple-compound) and consistency ("consistent" vs. "inconsistent") revealed no statistically significant differences. Therefore, although the RTs did not reveal the relative difficulty of the tasks, we were assured that the observed differences in accuracy were not due to speed-accuracy tradeoffs.
Discussion
The relative difficulty of the discrimination tasks that was observed in Experiments 1 and 2 was replicated in Experiment 3. We thus safely conclude that any generalized deficit from the common cue discrimination to the compound discrimination caused by their sharing the same number of elements (two) was not the source of the observed order of discrimination difficulty in this and the earlier experiments.
General Discussion
We set out to clarify the fundamental differences between the similarity metrics that underlie Kruschke's (1992) ALCOVE and Pearce's (1994) CCM and to design an investigation that highlighted these differences to determine which model provided the better fit of the data. It is interesting to note that neither metric predicted the actual order of discrimination difficulty exhibited by our participants.
Both ALCOVE and CCM include additional mechanisms that affect their behavior; but, simulations revealed that these mechanisms have no effect on their ordinal predictions for our three discriminations. There is variation, however, in how each model can be applied to any given learning situation. In the Variations in How Learning Is Simulated section, we consider the potential effects of the following: (a) including context cues, (b) explicitly coding feature absence, (c) including explicit training involving trials with no features, and (d) including the number of features present as a discriminative cue. We then consider a nongeometric model of similarity, Tversky's (1977) feature contrast model, and close with a discussion of the possible action of attentional processes in judgments of similarity.
Variations in How Learning Is Simulated
Including context cues. In the application of associative learning models to various discrimination tasks, it has sometimes been necessary to invoke the possible action of context cues. Rescorla and Wagner (1972) proposed the inclusion of context cues to explain the detrimental effect of the presentation of trials involving an outcome (the unconditioned stimulus [US]) without a preceding cue (the conditioned stimulus [CS] ). The addition of US-alone trials was known to reduce conditioning to a CS that was always followed by the US (Rescorla, 1967) . The Rescorla-Wagner model accounted for the detrimental effect of adding US-alone trials by assuming that these trials produce a stronger context-US association. Because trials with the CS involve two competing predictors (the CS and the context), as the context acquires associative strength through the presentation of US-alone trials, the CS must compete with a strong context thus producing a weaker CS-US association.
The addition of a context cue to the configural representations of ALCOVE, however, has no effect. The context is assumed to be identical across the various cue trials; given that ALCOVE measures similarity by the number of differences between configurations, adding common elements will not affect judgments of similarity (recall that ALCOVE predicted that the simple and common cue discriminations would be equally difficult despite the difference in the presence of a common element, X).
The addition of a context cue, however, will change the judged similarity of configurations in CCM. Adding an extra common feature to all of the trials will retard learning on all of the trials, but the effect will not be uniform. Understanding why this is so involves revisiting Equation 5.
Without context, Equation 5 predicts that the similarity between A and B is 0 2 /(1 ϫ 1) ϭ 0.00, the similarity between XC and XD is 1 2 /(2 ϫ 2) ϭ 0.25, and the similarity between YE and ZF is 0 2 /(2 ϫ 2) ϭ 0.00. When context is included as an additional common element, Equation 5 shows that the similarity between A and B becomes 1 2 /(2 ϫ 2) ϭ 0.25, the similarity between XC and XD becomes 2 2 /(3 ϫ 3) ϭ 0.44, and the similarity between YE and ZF becomes 1 2 /(3 ϫ 3) ϭ 0.11. Thus, the original ordering, simple ϭ compound Ͼ common feature, now becomes compound Ͼ simple Ͼ common feature, which still does not accord with the observed order of difficulty (although it better accords with that observed in some other studies; e.g., Gati & Tversky, 1984; Ritov et al., 1990) .
The similarity computation presented in the previous paragraph assumed that the context and punctate cues were of equal salience. It is important to note that the choice of relative salience is irrelevant; including a nonzero salience for the context always results in the compound discrimination being easier than the simple discrimination, in direct contrast to the observed data.
To demonstrate, assume that the salience of each punctate cue is 1.0 and the salience of the context is . By Equation 5, the similarity between A and B is 2 /(2 ϫ 2) ϭ 0.25 2 and the similarity between YE and ZF is 2 /(3 ϫ 3) ϭ 0.11 2 . Thus, for a nonzero salience, , the greater similarity between A and B of the simple discrimination (0.25 2 ) will make it more difficult to learn than the less similar YE and ZF configurations of the compound discrimination (0.11 2 ). It is only when context has no salience ( ϭ 0) that the two discriminations are predicted to be of equal difficulty.
We can thus safely conclude that the observed order of difficulty derived from ALCOVE's and CCM's similarity metrics is not due to the indirect action of context cues.
Coding of absent events with negative values. Thus far, we have coded the presence and absence of events as 1 and 0, respectively. This choice of coding is consistent with that presented in the applications of these models by various authors. Nevertheless, coding the absence of an event or a feature with a negative value rather than a zero value has been shown to have interesting and important consequences in other connectionist models (e.g., Hertz, Krogh, & Palmer, 1991; Tassoni, 1995) . For example, Tassoni (1995) examined coding of event absence as a value between 0 and Ϫ1. For Tassoni, absence was defined in terms of its informativeness; an expected or unobtrusive absence is coded with a value close to 0, whereas a highly unexpected or salient absence is coded with a value close to Ϫ1 (cf. Van Hamme & Wasserman, 1994) .
To determine whether coding an absent cue with a Ϫ1 would alter either model's predictions, we examined the consequences of this coding in Equations 2 and 5. For ALCOVE (Equation 2), the coding change would uniformly increase the distance between dissimilar configurations; the city-block distance would simply be twice as large as it was with a 0 coding of cue absence. Using a value less extreme than Ϫ1 only serves to reduce the scaling constant on the original city-block distance. So, coding absence using a negative number would have no effect on the ordinal predictions derived from ALCOVE's similarity metric (although it does have quantitative effects on performance in our task).
For CCM (Equation 5 ), the coding change would have a more profound effect, because terms that previously had no effect (any multiplicative term involving an absent cue produced a 0) would 
where the total number of features includes both present and absent features. This formulation differs from the original in that the denominator is now constant for all configurations (for k cues, the denominator is k 2 ), whereas in the original the denominator involved only those features present in the two configurations being compared. There were a total of nine relevant features in our experiment (A, B, C, D, E, F, X, Y, and Z); therefore, according to Equation 6, the similarity between the A and B trials would be 5/(9 ϫ 9) ϭ 0.06, the similarity between XC and XD trials would also be 5/(9 ϫ 9) ϭ 0.06, and the similarity between the YE and ZF trials would be 1/(9 ϫ 9) ϭ 0.01.
Thus, the use of a Ϫ1 coding produces a predicted order of difficulty, compound Ͼ simple ϭ common cue, that again does not accord with the observed data. In our sampling of the range of values between 0 and Ϫ1 exclusive, we found that these values produced an ordering, compound Ͼ simple Ͼ common cue, that was between the compound ϭ simple Ͼ common cue order produced by coding an absent event as 0 and the compound Ͼ simple ϭ common cue order produced by coding an absent event as Ϫ1. Unfortunately, none of these qualitative predictions by CCM corresponds with that observed in our participants' behavior. Therefore, coding absent events as having negative valence does not salvage ALCOVE (as noted earlier) or CCM.
Inclusion of null trials. Young et al. (2000) demonstrated that the explicit inclusion of null trials (in which no events occur) during training is critical to deriving correct predictions for positive and negative patterning from a simplified ALCOVE model (in which there was no attentional learning).
In the simulations reported above, null trials were not included because they were not advocated by the authors of these models. But, it is possible that their inclusion may help us to derive correct predictions in our task. Unfortunately, adding null trials to our simulations of ALCOVE produced undesirable consequences; the null trials actually made the simple discrimination much more difficult than either of the other two discriminations, a step in the wrong direction. This outcome was produced by the greater similarity of the single element configurations (A or B) to the null vector (which differs in the absence of a single cue, A or B, from the single element configurations) and the lesser similarity of the two element configurations (XC, XD, YE, and ZF) to the null vector (which differs in the absence of two cues from these configurations). Similarity to the null vector (which is never followed by the outcome) retards discriminative learning because any generalized responding derived from this vector decreases the perceived differences between configurations as a function of their similarity to this common, null-vector stimulus. Adding null trials thus exacerbates the predictive failures of ALCOVE by making the simple discrimination more difficult.
Adding null trials to CCM has no effect unless a context cue is assumed (as described earlier); doing so produces a similarity metric that falls prey to the same problems as the one used by ALCOVE.
Inclusion of number of cues as a discriminative stimulus. Another possibility considered by Young et al. (2000) is the inclusion of a feature indicating the number of elements that constitute a stimulus (e.g., 1 for A, 2 for XC) as a discriminative component of the stimulus. Including element number would make A and B more similar to each other (they both have one element) and XC, XD, YE, and YZ more similar to one another (they all have two elements). This change also makes the one-element configurations of the simple discrimination less similar to the two-element configurations of the compound and common cue discriminations that will be more similar to one another.
Recall that the similarity metric of ALCOVE predicts that accuracy will be ordered compound Ͼ simple ϭ common cue, whereas the similarity metric of CCM predicts that accuracy will be ordered simple ϭ compound Ͼ common cue. If the number of elements is a discriminative feature that truly affects generalization, then the greater difficulty of the common cue discrimination will generalize more to the compound discrimination than to the simple discrimination. This differential generalization could make the compound discrimination more difficult than the simple discrimination, thus producing the observed order of difficulty.
Although simulations of ALCOVE confirmed this prediction, Experiment 3 was explicitly designed to test for this possibility by training participants with only one of the two-element discriminations (compound or common cue). The original ordering (observed in Experiment 1) was preserved, thus indicating that generalization due to element number was not the source of the relative order of difficulty observed in Experiments 1 and 2.
A Nongeometric Metric of Similarity
Thus far we have concentrated on two geometric measures of similarity, the Minkowski metric used in ALCOVE and the metric used in the CCM. Tversky (1977) proposed an alternative formulation of similarity, the feature contrast model, that has met with considerable success. According to the feature contrast model, similarity is a function of both the common and distinctive features possessed by the items being compared. The proposal is quite straightforward-the more features that two items share, the more similar are the items, and the more features that two items do not share, the less similar are the items. Perceived similarity is a function of the difference in the number of common features and the number of distinctive features:
where x, y, and z are free parameters, f is an unspecified monotonically increasing function, A പ B designates the set of features possessed by both A and B, A Ϫ B designates the features possessed by A and not by B, and B Ϫ A designates the features possessed by B but not by A. The common features model and the distinctive features model are thus special cases of the more general feature contrast model (Sattath & Tversky, 1987) .
Although the feature contrast model is a good descriptor of judged similarity in a wide range of situations (Gati & Tversky, 1984; Ritov et al., 1990; Tversky, 1977) , it also predicts that the addition of distinctive features will decrease perceived similarity (i.e., make it easier to discriminate between items to be compared). Although this is indeed the case in many similarity judgment tasks, predictive-learning tasks like our own (in which the features are spatially separate and not integrated) do not appear to conform to this prediction. We believe that all of these metrics of similarity fail to account for our results because of attentional limitations.
Allocation of Attention: A Limited Resource
Because of the established success of configural models like ALCOVE and CCM in various domains, we were hopeful that one of them would emerge as a strong account of our predictivelearning task. The many demonstrations of their failure to account for our present results suggest an explanation that appeals to an additional mechanism: limitations in attentional capacity produced by an asymmetry in the attentional demands of feature presence and absence when those features involve multiple objects or events.
In our predictive-learning task, a candidate cause either occurs or does not. When it occurs, it commands attention; when it does not occur, it does not command attention (except, perhaps, by its unexpected absence; cf. Tassoni, 1995; Van Hamme & Wasserman, 1994) . By this account, the simple discrimination is easier than the compound discrimination because in the former, attention is wholly devoted to one event at a time (e.g., A), whereas in the latter attention must be divided between events (e.g., YE).
Note that this proposed asymmetry in salience for specific dimensional values (event occurrence commands more attention than event nonoccurrence) has been documented by others in various contexts (e.g., Goldstone, 1994; Hearst, 1991; Newman, Wolff, & Hearst, 1980; Tassoni, 1995; Van Hamme & Wasserman, 1994 ). Kruschke's ALCOVE includes a mechanism for attentional tradeoffs across dimensions, but these shifts in attention are from one omnipresent dimension (e.g., color) to another (e.g., size). Pearce's CCM is constrained to differential attention to dimensions or to combinations of dimensions and thus has the same basic limitation as ALCOVE.
Kruschke and his colleagues have documented the need for capacity limitations on attention across dimensions and have incorporated these limitations into extensions of ALCOVE (e.g., Kruschke, 1996 Kruschke, , 2001 Kruschke & Johansen, 1999 )-when there is more attention allocated to one dimension, there is less allocated to the others. Although the original ALCOVE permitted a capacity limit on attention, this capacity limit was rarely imposed because it was not critical for fitting most data sets. In our event-based predictive-learning task, each trial involves some dimensions (i.e., events) that are present and some that are not, whereas ALCOVE assumes that each dimension is omnipresent. By our account, the absent events should not tax attention to the degree that present events do.
Others have examined the division of attention across multiple objects or across multiple features of the same object (e.g., Duncan, 1984 Duncan, , 1993 Vecera & Farah, 1994) and consistently found that it is harder to divide attention among multiple relevant objects than among multiple relevant features of a single object. ALCOVE was originally designed as a model of categorization: a task in which the response depends on the features of a single object. CCM was originally designed as a more general model of animal learning, one in which the features may be part of a single object (e.g., its color and shape) or may be multiple objects (e.g., a light and a tone). Both of these models have been co-opted by researchers as accounts of predictive learning, in which the predictors are multiple objects (e.g., foods, diseases, or chemicals) or events (e.g., a plane flyby or a keypress). Thus, ALCOVE was not designed for these new domains and CCM used the same similarity metric for two stimulus classes that appear to behave quite differently. The lesson of the current set of studies is that these models require modification to better capture human behavior when the predictors involve the presence or absence of multiple events or objects.
It is, of course, possible to supplement ALCOVE or CCM with a mechanism that produces an additional processing load (or, inversely, frees up capacity) as a function of the presence or absence of events. To end on an optimistic note, we propose a framework for one such mechanism.
Kruschke and Johansen (1999) offered a formal specification of a capacity-constrained attentional mechanism:
where j specifies the jth dimension, ␣ i is the attention allocated to dimension i, ␥ i is the underlying gain for that dimension (a form of internal attentional strength), and P is a normalization constant that reflects the attentional capacity of the learner. As P increases, the capacity is increased, thus resulting in smaller attentional tradeoffs (i.e., attending more to one dimension produces a small contraction on attention to other dimensions); as P decreases, the capacity is decreased, thus resulting in large attentional tradeoffs (i.e., attending more to one dimension produces a large contraction on attention to other dimensions). These tradeoffs occur for all dimensions. There are at least two modifications to Equation 8 that would predict our results. In the first modification, the ␣ (or, alternatively, the gain) for "absent" dimensions may be 0; thus, when a feature or object is added to a stimulus, it will compete for attention as specified by Equation 8, but when it is absent, it will not (or, at least, provide less competition). Therefore, an additional, redundant cue may detract attention and thus at least partially offset the advantage that it might normally afford.
In the second modification, the capacity limit, P, may be partially determined by the number of objects or events that must be attended. To see how this alternative can produce our results, assume that the gains for all stimuli are 1.0 and that P is 1.0 divided by the number of features present. In our task, there are nine different dimensions (A, B, C, D, E, F, X, Y, and Z). In the A versus B discrimination, each stimulus would have an attentional strength of exp(1)/(9 ϫ exp(1 1 )) 1 ϭ 0.11 (each stimulus gets one ninth of the available attention). In the YE versus ZF discrimination, however, each stimulus would have an attentional strength of exp(1)/(9 ϫ exp(1 0.5 )) 2 ϭ .01. Therefore, the benefit of additional distinguishing features located on multiple objects can be partially or wholly offset by dividing attention among these objects.
Although ALCOVE was not originally designed for situations involving presence and absence of events, the extensions that we offer provide possible directions for extending ALCOVE as a model for tasks involving the presence and absence of multiple objects, parts, spatially separated features, or events. The precise method by which a capacity-constrained mechanism would operate when multiple objects are present-each with multiple dimensions of discriminability (some of which are omnipresent and some of which are not)-will require further investigation. The prior success of ALCOVE, however, gives us hope in it as a basis of a more complete model of predictive learning.
Conclusions
Despite the surface similarities between the way in which ALCOVE and CCM measure configural similarity, our analyses revealed a fundamental difference between them. Furthermore, our empirical data demonstrated that neither metric anticipated the relative difficulty of three rather straightforward discriminations. After considering a number of alternative explanations for this shortcoming, we believe that it is necessary to invoke the notion of limited capacity attention and differential attention to event presence and absence. Neither ALCOVE nor CCM includes the necessary psychological mechanisms that appear to operate in our task. In addition, although the ordinal predictions of these models were unaffected by cue order, we observed significant quantitative effects (revealed in Experiment 2) that should be explored. Be that as it may, the continued success of these configural models as instantiations of psychological theories of human and animal learning suggests that a well-reasoned and supported extension is well worth the effort.
